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O P I N I ON  
   
 
ROTH, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Claudia Marquez Moreno appeals her conviction for 
falsely and willfully representing herself as a United States 
citizen in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 911.  Her principal 
argument is that her validly issued passport constitutes 
conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship under 22 U.S.C. § 2705.  
For this reason, she alleges that the government failed to 
prove lack of citizenship and that the District Court erred in 
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denying her motion for acquittal.  Because we hold that, 
under the language of 22 U.S.C. § 2705, a passport  
constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if the passport 
was issued to a U.S. citizen, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
 
I. 
 Moreno was born in Mexico in 1971.  She was adopted 
by a U.S. citizen when she was nine years old.  In 1981, New 
Mexico issued her a certificate of live birth indicating that her 
place of birth was Mexico.  In 1994, Moreno was convicted 
of possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance.  
In 1998, she was convicted of false imprisonment.  In 2006, 
she was deported to Mexico, after an immigration judge, the 
Board of Immigration Appeals, and the Fifth Circuit found 
that she was not a U.S. citizen.  Marquez-Moreno v. 
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 548, 560 (5th Cir. 2006).  Although she 
was prohibited from reentering the United States without 
permission, she returned to the United States in 2007. 
 
 In 2007, Moreno applied to the State Department for a 
passport, listing her place of birth as New Mexico.  The State 
Department issued Moreno a valid passport.  In 2008, 
Moreno’s passport was confiscated by United States Border 
Patrol in El Paso, Texas.  However, it was never revoked.  In 
2010, she was placed into Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) custody pending deportation, but she was 
released pending further investigation and action by the State 
Department when Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
officials discovered that she had been issued a valid passport. 
   
 In March 2011, before taking a trip to St. Thomas, 
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Moreno contacted a DHS official to determine whether she 
was a U.S. citizen.  She was told that she was not a citizen.  
On March 16, 2011, when she arrived in St. Thomas after 
taking a cruise to a neighboring island, she was asked by an 
immigration officer about her citizenship.  She responded that 
she was a U.S. citizen and presented her New Mexico driver’s 
license.  The officer contacted a DHS agent who then 
interviewed Moreno.  When he asked her about her 
citizenship, she responded that she was a U.S. citizen and 
presented a certificate of live birth from the state of New 
Mexico, a New Mexico driver’s license, and a copy of her 
U.S. passport. 
 
 Moreno was arrested and indicted for falsely 
representing herself to be a U.S. citizen, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 911, which states:  “[w]hoever falsely and willfully 
represents himself to be a citizen of the United States shall be 
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than three years, 
or both.”  18 U.S.C. § 911.  As the District Court instructed 
the jury at the trial, the three elements of a § 911 violation are 
(1) that the defendant knowingly and falsely represented 
herself to be a United States citizen, (2) that she was not a 
citizen at the time of her representation, and (3) that she made 
the false representation willfully.   
 
At 7 p.m. the day before trial, the government 
disclosed two documents to Moreno:  (1) a DHS report 
describing an investigation concluding that Moreno’s 
passport was valid but recommending further investigation 
into her citizenship, and (2) a DHS report stating that Moreno 
should be released into the United States and that her 
deportation should be stayed until the State Department 
revoked her passport.  Moreno did not request a continuance, 
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even though one was offered by the District Court.  The 
District Court did not admit either document into evidence 
and rejected Moreno’s claim of a Brady violation on the 
grounds that the information in the reports did not contain 
exculpatory information and that the same information had 
been previously disclosed.  
 
During the trial, Moreno also sought to introduce her 
FBI criminal history report, which listed her citizenship as 
“United States,” and an accompanying FOIA letter.  The 
District Court, however, denied her motion on the grounds 
that under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 the evidence was 
cumulative and could confuse the jury.   
 
 Moreno’s principal defense was that she had been 
issued a valid U.S. passport and that the passport constituted 
conclusive evidence of citizenship.  The government 
conceded that the passport had never been revoked.  
Nevertheless, the government argued to the District Court and 
the jury that the passport was “issued in error.”  Moreno 
objected to this argument on the grounds that the government 
impermissibly took inconsistent positions as to the passport’s 
status. 
 
Moreno requested that the District Court instruct the 
jury that a passport “is conclusive evidence of U.S. 
citizenship.”  The District Court refused to issue this 
instruction.  Moreno then filed a Rule 29 motion for acquittal, 
which the District Court also denied.  Moreno was convicted 
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 911 and was sentenced to twenty-
nine months imprisonment.  This appeal followed. 
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II.1
A.   
 
 Moreno argues on appeal that (1) the District Court 
should have granted her motion for acquittal because, under 
22 U.S.C. § 2705, her validly issued passport constituted 
conclusive proof of citizenship and (2) the District Court 
should have instructed the jury that her passport was 
conclusive proof of citizenship.  We hold that a passport 
constitutes conclusive proof of citizenship under 22 U.S.C. § 
2705 only if it has been issued to a U.S. citizen.  For that 
reason, the District Court did not err in denying Moreno’s 
Rule 29 motion for acquittal or in refusing to adopt Moreno’s 
proposed jury instruction.  
  
1. 
 We exercise plenary review over the denial of a 
motion for acquittal.  United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 
494 (3d Cir. 2006).  However, we “review the record in the 
light more favorable to the prosecution to determine whether 
any rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt based on the available evidence.”  
Id. 
 
 Moreno argues that her U.S. passport constituted 
conclusive proof of her U.S. citizenship under 22 U.S.C. § 
2705 and that therefore the government failed to prove lack of 
citizenship, a necessary element of a § 911 violation.  22 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
and this Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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U.S.C. § 2705 provides: 
 
The following documents shall have 
the same force and effect as proof of 
United States citizenship as 
certificates of naturalization or of 
citizenship issued by the Attorney 
General or by a court having 
naturalization jurisdiction:  (1) A 
passport, during its period of validity 
(if such period is the maximum 
period authorized by law), issued by 
the Secretary of State to a citizen of 
the United States. . . .  
22 U.S.C. § 2705.   
The text of 22 U.S.C. § 2705 does not permit 
Moreno’s interpretation.  In any case involving statutory 
interpretation, we must begin with the statutory text.  See 
United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 4 (1997).  “[W]hen the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at 
least where the disposition required by the test is not 
absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”  Lamie v. U.S. 
Trustee, 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citations omitted).  “An 
interpretation is absurd when it defies rationality or renders 
the statute nonsensical and superfluous.”  United States v. 
Fontaine, 697 F.3d 221, 228 (3d Cir. 2012) (citations and 
internal quotation marks omitted).2
                                                 
2 The Court should look to the statute’s legislative history 
only if the text of the statute is ambiguous.  Gonzales, 520 
U.S. at 6.  Moreover, there is no legislative history here 
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By its text, § 2705 provides that a passport will serve 
as conclusive proof of citizenship only if it was “issued by the 
Secretary of State to a citizen of the United States.”  22 
U.S.C. § 2705 (emphasis added).  Under the plain meaning of 
the statute, a passport is proof of citizenship only if its holder 
was actually a citizen of the United States when the passport 
was issued.  Under the language of the statute, the logical 
premise needed to establish conclusive proof of citizenship 
consists of two independent conditions:  (1) having a valid 
passport and (2) being a U.S. citizen.  The second condition is 
not necessarily satisfied when the first condition is satisfied.  
For example, the Secretary of State issues passports not only 
to U.S. citizens but also to U.S. nationals.  See 22 C.F.R. § 
50.4 (noting that United States nationals may apply for a 
United States passport); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1101(22) (“The 
term ‘national of the United States’ means (A) a citizen of the 
United States, or (B) a person who, though not a citizen of the 
United States, owes permanent allegiance to the United 
States.”).  
  
Here, Moreno satisfies the first condition but not the 
second:  she has a valid U.S. passport but is not a U.S. 
citizen—and was not one at the time the passport was issued.  
                                                                                                             
guiding the inquiry into the scope of § 2705.  See Magnuson 
v. Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 334 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that 
the statute was enacted without controversy in 1982 after a 
Congressman sent a question to the State Department and 
received a response stating that the State Department and INS 
would support legislation to make a passport evidence of 
citizenship).   
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As a result, this textual interpretation of the statute leads to 
the conclusion that the District Court properly denied 
Moreno’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal because, under § 2705, 
a valid U.S. passport serves as conclusive proof of U.S. 
citizenship only if the passport was issued to a U.S. citizen, 
which Moreno is not.  
 
This is an issue of first impression in the Third Circuit.  
Moreno argues that other courts that have interpreted § 2705 
as establishing that a valid passport is conclusive proof of 
U.S. citizenship.  See, e.g., Vana v. Att’y Gen., 341 F. App’x 
836, 839 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (“[A] United States 
passport is considered to be conclusive proof of United States 
citizenship . . . .”); Magnuson v. Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 333 
(9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]hrough section 2705, Congress 
authorized passport holders to use the passport as conclusive 
proof of citizenship.”) (dictum); Edwards v. Bryson, 884 F. 
Supp. 2d 202, 206 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding the holder of an 
expired valid U.S. passport to be a U.S. citizen and reasoning 
that “[t]o hold otherwise, would lessen the import of a 
passport as compared to that of a certificate of naturalization 
or a certificate of citizenship, which is exactly what § 2705 
forbids . . . .”); United States v. Clarke, 628 F. Supp. 2d 15, 
21 (D.D.C. 2009) (“§ 2705 puts passports in the same status 
as certificates of naturalization for the purpose of proving 
U.S. citizenship.”); In re Villanueva, 19 I. & N. Dec. 101, 103 
(B.I.A. 1984) (“Accordingly, we hold that unless void on its 
face, a valid United States passport issued to an individual as 
a citizen of the United States is not subject to collateral attack 
in administrative immigration proceedings but constitutes 
conclusive proof of such person’s United States 
citizenship.”).   
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However, we are not bound by these cases and believe 
that this interpretation is atextual because it effectively reads 
the phrase “to a citizen of the United States” out of the 
statute.  Thus, it does not give effect to the statute as written.3
 
  
“[W]here the text of a statute is unambiguous, the statute 
should be enforced as written and only the most extraordinary 
showing of contrary intentions in the legislative history will 
justify a departure from that language.”  In re Philadelphia 
Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 314 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Because the text of § 
2705 is unambiguous, we hold that a passport is conclusive 
proof of citizenship only if its holder was actually a citizen of 
the United States when it was issued.   
Judge Smith asserts in his dissenting opinion that the 
relevant inquiry under § 2705 is not whether the passport 
holder is a U.S. citizen but rather whether the State 
Department has determined the passport holder to be a U.S. 
citizen.  (Dissenting Op. at 4).  We disagree.  Such a reading 
elevates the State Department’s role in the determination of 
citizenship beyond its historic status.  Traditionally, 
citizenship can be proved by:  (1) certificate of naturalization; 
(2) certificate of citizenship; or (3) birth certificate.  
Certificates of naturalization and certificates of citizenship are 
granted by a court having naturalization jurisdiction or by the 
                                                 
3 Moreover, none of these cases addressed the precise 
question presented here:  whether § 2705 constitutes 
conclusive proof of citizenship in the context of a prosecution 
under 18 U.S.C. § 911.  In fact, as the Eighth Circuit noted in 
Keil v. Triveline, “no court has held that possession of a 
passport precludes prosecution under [18 U.S.C.] § 911.”  661 
F.3d 981, 987 (8th Cir. 2011). 
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Attorney General.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1443(e); see also 
Magnuson, 911 F.2d at 333; Clarke, 628 F. Supp. 2d at 17-18.  
While the State Department historically has had exclusive 
authority to grant and revoke passports, 22 U.S.C. § 211a; 8 
U.S.C. § 1504, it has not had the power to determine 
citizenship.  See Magnuson, 911 F.2d at 333 (“Prior to the 
enactment of section 2705, only the Attorney General or a 
naturalization court could determine who is a citizen of the 
United States.”).  We should not let § 2705, a statute with a 
thin and peculiar legislative history, see supra note 2, 
overwhelm the historic way of determining citizenship.4
 
  Our 
reading of § 2705 gives effect to the statute as written but 
does not go so far as to empower the State Department to 
determine citizenship through the issuance of a passport. 
For these reasons, the District Court did not err in 
denying Moreno’s Rule 29 motion for acquittal.5
                                                 
4 We acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit took a different 
position in Magnuson, stating that “by section 2705, Congress 
has vested the power in the Secretary of State to determine 
who is a United States citizen.”  911 F.2d at 333.  Again, we 
are not bound by this case and do not find it persuasive. 
 
5 Moreno also argues that the government failed to show that 
Moreno made a false assertion of citizenship willfully.  This 
argument is meritless.  In 2006, she was deported after an 
immigration judge, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and 
the Fifth Circuit found that she was not a U.S. citizen.  
Marquez-Moreno, 455 F.3d at 560.  In 2008, her passport was 
confiscated.  Immediately prior to her trip to St. Thomas in 
March 2011, a DHS official informed her that she was not a 
citizen.  Despite receiving all of these notifications that she 
was not a U.S. citizen, Moreno asserted that she was a U.S. 
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2. 
Moreno also argues that the District Court should have 
used her proposed jury instruction stating that “[a] passport 
issued by the Secretary of State is conclusive proof of United 
States citizenship.”  “We exercise plenary review to 
determine whether jury instructions misstated the applicable 
law, but in the absence of a misstatement we review for abuse 
of discretion.”  United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 173-
74 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Because we find that a valid passport is conclusive 
proof of U.S. citizenship under 22 U.S.C. § 2705 only if its 
holder was actually a citizen when it was issued, the District 
Court properly declined to adopt Moreno’s proposed 
instruction.   
 
B. 
Moreno raises three additional arguments on appeal:  
(1) the District Court should have ruled that the government’s 
untimely disclosure of reports regarding the validity of her 
passport violated Brady; (2) the District Court should have 
allowed Moreno to introduce FOIA documents and an FBI 
report listing her citizenship as “United States”; and (3) the 
District Court should have ruled that the government engaged 
in misconduct by stating that Moreno’s passport had been 
“issued in error” despite acknowledging that the passport had 
not been revoked.  We find that none of these arguments 
merit reversal of the District Court’s judgment. 
                                                                                                             
citizen when interviewed in St. Thomas.  Therefore, the 
government presented sufficient evidence for the jury to 
conclude that Moreno’s misrepresentation was willful. 
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1. 
Moreno argues that the disclosure of documents at 7 
p.m. on the day before trial violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 
U.S. 83, 87 (1963).  In reviewing Brady claims, we review 
the District Court’s conclusions of law de novo and its 
findings of fact for clear error.  United States v. Risha, 445 
F.3d 298, 303 (3d Cir. 2006).   
 
The government has an obligation to disclose any 
evidence favorable to the defense that is material as to guilt or 
punishment.  Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.  “Where the government 
makes Brady evidence available during the course of a trial in 
such a way that a defendant is able effectively to use it, due 
process is not violated and Brady is not contravened.”  United 
States v. Johnson, 816 F.2d 918, 924 (3d Cir. 1987).  Brady is 
not implicated if there is no prejudice to the defendant.  See 
United States v. Bansal, 663 F.3d 634, 670 (3d Cir. 2011).  
  
Here, the two documents, a DHS report describing an 
investigation concluding that Moreno’s passport was valid but 
recommending further investigation into her citizenship and a 
DHS report stating that Moreno should be released into the 
United States and that her deportation should be stayed until 
the State Department revoked her passport, were made 
available to Moreno before trial.  Moreno had the opportunity 
to cross-examine a government witness about the contents of 
the documents.  Further, Moreno did not request a 
continuance, even though the District Court offered one.  
Moreno therefore cannot establish a Brady violation because 
she was able to use the documents and suffered no prejudice 
as a result of the government’s allegedly untimely disclosure.   
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2. 
Moreno argues that the District Court should have 
allowed her to introduce FOIA documents and an FBI report 
listing her citizenship as “United States.”  The District Court 
excluded these documents under Rule 403.  “We review a 
district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for 
abuse of discretion, and such discretion is construed 
especially broadly in the context of Rule 403.”  United States 
v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).  “In order to justify 
reversal, a district court’s analysis and resulting conclusion 
must be arbitrary or irrational.”  United States v. Universal 
Rehab. Servs. (PA), Inc., 205 F.3d 657, 665 (3d Cir. 2000) (en 
banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
The documents Moreno sought to introduce into 
evidence listed her citizenship as “United States,” but the jury 
had already heard testimony about government documents 
listing her as a United States citizen, making this evidence 
cumulative.  Moreover, the documents also listed Moreno’s 
criminal history, including multiple arrests and convictions.  
Thus, the documents would have had to be heavily redacted if 
they were to be presented to the jury, which could cause juror 
confusion.  These facts do not show that the District Court 
abused its discretion in excluding these documents under 
Rule 403. 
   
3. 
Moreno argues that the District Court should have 
ruled that the government engaged in misconduct by stating 
that Moreno’s passport had been “issued in error” despite 
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acknowledging that the passport had not been revoked.  
Moreno made a timely objection at trial.  This Court reviews 
contemporaneous objections of prosecutorial misconduct for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Brennan, 326 F.3d 
176, 182 (3d Cir. 2003). 
   
Moreno claims that the doctrine of judicial estoppel 
should have precluded the government from arguing that the 
passport was issued in error after having conceded at another 
point that Moreno’s passport had never been officially 
revoked.  See Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540, 543 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“Judicial estoppel prevents parties from taking 
different positions on matters in litigation to gain advantage.” 
(citation omitted)).  Moreno’s argument is unavailing because 
a “revoked” passport is distinct from a passport “issued in 
error.”  Under 8 U.S.C. § 1504, the Secretary of State may 
revoke a passport issued in error.  However, passports issued 
in error are not automatically revoked.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1504 
(noting steps to be taken to revoke a passport).  As a result, 
the government’s position that the passport was never 
revoked is not inconsistent with the statement that the 
passport was issued in error.  Therefore, Moreno’s claim of 
misconduct fails because the government did not take 
inconsistent positions at trial.   
 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s judgment. 
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United States v. Moreno, No. 12-1460 
SMITH, Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
My colleagues and I agree that Claudia Moreno 
acquired her passport through mendacity. Bad facts, 
however, should not cause us to rewrite a statute. In my 
view, 22 U.S.C. § 2705(1) requires us to treat Moreno’s 
passport as conclusive evidence of her U.S. citizenship. 
For that reason, I respectfully dissent. 
The majority’s reading of § 2705 contains a critical 
flaw—one that eviscerates the statute. To see the flaw, 
one needs simply to restate the holding: “a passport con-
stitutes conclusive proof of citizenship only if the pass-
port was issued to a U.S. citizen.” Majority Op. at 3. In 
other words, a person can use a passport as conclusive 
evidence that she is a U.S. citizen only if she first proves 
that she is a U.S. citizen. At that point, of course, conclu-
sive evidence of citizenship is unnecessary, and so the 
statute becomes inoperative by depriving passports of 
any special evidentiary value. This reading is “at odds 
with one of the most basic interpretive canons, that ‘[a] 
statute should be construed . . . so that no part will be in-
operative or superfluous, void or insignificant.’” Corley 
v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (quoting 
Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). Congress surely 
did not intend to pass a statute without any legal effect. 
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No other circuit has said that § 2705 requires a 
preliminary showing that the passport holder is a U.S. 
citizen. Not one. Instead, most courts have said that pass-
ports have the same evidentiary effect as certificates of 
naturalization, which are conclusive proof of citizenship 
and are not subject to collateral attack. E.g., Magnuson v. 
Baker, 911 F.2d 330, 333 (9th Cir. 1990) (“The statute 
plainly states that a passport has the same force and ef-
fect as a certificate of naturalization or citizenship . . . . 
The holders of these other documents can use them as 
conclusive evidence of citizenship. Therefore, so can a 
holder of a passport.”); Edwards v. Bryson, 884 F. Supp. 
2d 202, 206 (E.D. Pa. 2012); United States v. Clarke, 628 
F. Supp. 2d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2009); Banchong v. Kane, 
No. CV-09-0582-PHX-MHM (JRI), 2009 WL 6496505, 
at *5 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2009); Matter of Villanueva, 19 
I. & N. Dec. 101, 103 (B.I.A. 1984). Indeed, we have 
said as much in an admittedly nonprecedential opinion. 
Vana v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 341 F. App’x 836, 839 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam).*
                                           
* Although “[t]he Court by tradition does not cite [ ] its 
not precedential opinions as authority,” Third Circuit 
I.O.P. 5.7, I cite Vana merely to point out the intracircuit 
conflict created by the majority. 
 To be sure, the Eighth Circuit 
has suggested that passports offer no protection in crimi-
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nal cases, but even it acknowledged that passports would 
be “conclusive proof of citizenship in administrative im-
migration proceedings.” Keil v. Triveline, 661 F.3d 981, 
987 (8th Cir. 2011).  
The majority goes well beyond any of these cases. 
Through its reading of the requirement that passports be 
“issued by the Secretary of State to a citizen of the 
United States,” the majority suggests that passports are 
not conclusive evidence of citizenship in any proceed-
ing—a suggestion that creates a circuit split.  
How then to interpret this requirement without ef-
fectively rewriting the statute? The answer is straightfor-
ward, but it requires us to recognize that citizens are not 
the only ones who hold passports. The State Department 
may issue passports to noncitizens “owing allegiance . . . 
to the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 212. Such passports 
specify that “[t]he bearer is a United States national and 
not a United States citizen.” U.S. Dep’t of State, 7 For-
eign Aff. Manual § 1141(e) (Mar. 5, 2013), http:// 
www.state.gov/documents/organization/86758.pdf. The 
phrase “citizen of the United States” in § 2705 thus has 
the effect of preventing those determined by the State 
Department to be noncitizen nationals from using their 
passports as conclusive evidence of U.S. citizenship. At 
the same time, it allows those determined to be citizens to 
use their passports as conclusive evidence of their citi-
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zenship. See Mondaca-Vega v. Holder, No. CV-04-339-
FVS, 2011 WL 1195877, at *1 (E.D. Wash. Mar. 29, 
2011) (concluding that § 2705 requires a passport holder 
to show that “the Secretary of State has previously de-
termined he is a United States citizen” (emphasis 
added)). In short, the inquiry is whether the State De-
partment has determined the passport holder to be a U.S. 
citizen, not whether she actually is one. 
That is consistent with the idea that Congress has 
“centralize[d] passport authority . . . specifically in the 
Secretary of State.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 294–99 
(1981) (noting similarities between the original Passport 
Act and the current scheme). For example, the State De-
partment has exclusive authority to grant and revoke 
passports, 22 U.S.C. § 211a; 8 U.S.C. § 1504(a), to limit 
their period of validity, 22 U.S.C. § 217a, and to set fees, 
id. § 214. See also Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 
1436 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (recognizing the ex-
ecutive branch’s historical authority over passports). In 
fact, the State Department may revoke passports that 
were obtained through error or fraud. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1504(a); 22 C.F.R. § 51.62. Such passports become in-
valid and lose their conclusive evidentiary status. See 22 
C.F.R. § 51.4(f)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 2705 (limiting a pass-
port’s conclusive proof of citizenship to its “period of 
validity”). Section 2705 thus strengthens the State De-
partment’s authority over passports by preventing courts 
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from second-guessing its decisions. 
And that is precisely where the District Court went 
wrong. Moreno still has a valid passport, so the Court 
should have granted her motion for acquittal. If the pros-
ecutors wanted to go after Moreno, they should have 
asked the State Department to revoke her passport. 
I respectfully dissent. 
